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SPECIAL SECTION: RUSSIA AND THE NEWLY INDEPENDENT STATES 
 
Civil Society and Philanthropy Under Putin 
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In January 2006, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed into law a controversial 
bill regulating non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The act requires NGOs operat-
ing in Russia to re-register with the government, disclose their funding sources, and 
undergo expanded state auditing. At the same time, the Russian government has declared 
2006 “The Year of Philanthropy” (God blagotvoritel’nosti), and Russian officials are 
contemplating new ways to encourage charitable giving. We seek to analyze this apparent 
contradiction by exploring the complex relationships between Russian philanthropy and 
Russia’s government, civil society, and developing NGO sector. 
Philanthropy and Russian Politics 
There is no inherent contradiction between philanthropy and Russia’s current 
political system of “managed” or “sovereign” democracy. In recognition of philan-
thropy’s growing importance and its potential impact on society during the 2008 national 
elections and after, the Putin administration declared that 2006 would be “The Year of 
Philanthropy.” Russian officials hope that major philanthropists will support the govern-
ment’s “Four National Projects”: improving Russians’ healthcare, housing, agriculture, 
and education.  
The authorities fear, however, that Russian philanthropists might back other 
projects, including activities not supported by the current government. In March 2006, 
the bank accounts of the Open Russia Foundation, led by imprisoned Russian business-
man Mikhail B. Khodorkovsky, were frozen. The foundation had been active in the con-
troversial area of promoting civil liberties.2 It is too early to determine whether the move 
will further discourage Russian philanthropists from supporting politically controversial 
activities. Although arrested for tax fraud associated with his Yukos corporation, 
Khodorkovsky was independently funding opposition political parties at the time of his 
arrest, and had been cited in the media as a potential presidential candidate in 2008.  
Government officials have succeeded in concentrating philanthropy among a 
small number of mostly large corporate benefactors in order to exercise greater control 
over it. For example, current regulations make it difficult for an individual citizen to offer 
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a charitable donation. A potential benefactor must take the initiative of going to a branch 
of the Savings Bank of Russia and completing a complex form for even a modest dona-
tion. Partly as a result, a small number of wealthy Russian philanthropists and Russian 
corporations provide a large proportion of the aggregate donations.3
The Growth of Russian Philanthropy 
The increasing importance of philanthropy in Russia would naturally attract the 
attention of any Russian government. In recent years, charitable giving has expanded at a 
rapid pace. Although the overall rate of growth in the nonprofit sector has slowed consid-
erably since the 1990s, owners of large and medium-size Russian companies are becom-
ing more and more involved in charitable social welfare. Some analysts anticipate the 
emergence of several thousand private and corporate philanthropic foundations in the 
near future. Although a 2001 law ended virtually all tax breaks for charitable giving, 
approximately 60% of people making charitable donations have increased their contribu-
tions since 2001. At present, more than 80% of all Russian companies make charitable 
donations, amounting to an estimated 11 to 17% of their total profits. (Uncertainties 
regarding Russian statistics, especially those regarding taxable activities, make more pre-
cise estimates difficult.) Many of them have established a special “social budget” to fund 
charitable giving. In contrast, the typical Western company allocates only 1 to 2% of its 
profits for philanthropic purposes.4
The reasons for the recent growth of Russian philanthropy are complex. Russia 
has a rich tradition of pre-revolutionary charity, but historically such giving had been 
confined to the aristocracy. It was only at the turn of the 20th century, with the rise of 
wealthy industrialists, that other social classes and larger groups of people began to 
engage in patronage of the arts and support of the poor. In Soviet times, however, the 
authorities forbade philanthropy as a demeaning capitalist practice that challenged the 
commitment of the Soviet state and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to care for 
citizens’ material and spiritual needs.5 With the USSR’s demise, newly wealthy Russians 
appear to be returning to pre-Bolshevik traditions of proper social behavior.6
Patriotism also motivates much Russian philanthropy. Many philanthropists give 
money because they genuinely want to improve the lives of their fellow citizens. Under-
standing that the state today is fundamentally inefficient at providing public goods such 
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as healthcare, they feel duty-bound by patriotism to fill this gap. The younger generation 
is especially inclined to support a strong Russian society, despite their individualism and 
materialism. In addition, some large Russian corporations, seeking to gain access to 
international markets and capital, are trying to improve their global image through acts of 
philanthropy.7
Official coercion accounts for additional contributions. Three-fourths of Russian 
philanthropists report experiencing pressure from local authorities to donate to public 
projects. Ironically, half of this group looks favorably on such overtures, because they see 
the solicitations as strengthening their ties with the local bureaucracy. In addition, over 
70% said they would donate to state institutions despite this pressure, though often they 
would choose different recipients for their largesse—officials often pressure them to pay 
to sustain the decaying public infrastructure, in the manner of the 19th-century American 
“company town,” whereas the philanthropists would prefer to address urgent social 
needs. Although respondents believe that maintaining the infrastructure should be the 
government's responsibility, they acknowledge that official incompetence and corruption 
often prevent its fulfillment.8
Philanthropy in Russia is growing notwithstanding several political impediments. 
As noted, current tax legislation does not reward charitable giving. In addition, such 
donations, especially for small to medium-sized companies, often attract unwelcome 
attention from the authorities and public regulatory agencies such as the Federal Taxation 
Service. Government personnel often suspect that philanthropic donations seek to conceal 
shady business practices or other illicit activities. Representatives of the media and other 
social sectors, including the NGO community, also see much business philanthropy as 
motivated by a desire to secure favor with elites or, at worst, as covert forms of bribery. 
When a company announces that it will give money to state officials for supposed social 
purposes, such as purchasing better equipment for a local hospital, the immediate suspi-
cion is that the recipients will pocket some if not most of the funds. During Russia’s first 
years of independence under President Boris Yeltsin, the lax regulatory environment 
allowed many unscrupulous entrepreneurs to establish “foundations” that used their funds 
for shady and often illegal activities. Although these abuses seem less frequent in today’s 
Russia, the image of fraudulent charitable behavior persists.9 For this reason, much of 
Russian philanthropy is not publicized. 
Facts and Myths 
Russian philanthropy has many distinctive features. First, almost all of the dona-
tions stay in Russia. Russian philanthropists are overwhelmingly concerned with solving 
domestic problems. Not even a catastrophe on the scale of the December 2004 tsunami in 
Southeast Asia engendered substantial private Russian contributions to international 
humanitarian and relief operations. Second, very few philanthropists use NGOs to deliver 
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aid to fellow citizens. Most Russian donors see NGOs as inefficient if not thievish. In 
turn, most NGO leaders share common Russian prejudices against rich business leaders – 
the very people who make the largest philanthropic donations. Thus, it would be a gross 
misperception to characterize the Russian NGO community as predominately liberal or 
pro-Western. Finally, almost 90% of donations in Russia go to state-run bodies such as 
local orphanages and cultural institutions. This striking fact results partly from official 
coercion, partly from philanthropists’ general distrust of NGOs, and partly from a provi-
sion in the tax code that atypically permits some deductions for direct donations to state 
institutions. Whatever the cause, one result is that secular rather than religious causes 
obtain the overwhelming percentage of donations.  
Russian politicians and publicists often imply that Western governments and 
NGOs seek to use financial subventions to influence political developments in Russia and 
other countries. At least in Russia, the facts belie this perception. The contributions from 
Russian corporations constitute about 70% of the total value of all charitable donations in 
Russia.10 The remaining 30% is split between foreign donors and individual benefactors. 
Despite the popular myth of pervasive Western influence in Russia’s third sector, foreign 
private donors actually constitute only 8.4% of total Russian philanthropy, though they 
tend to contribute to different recipients than Russian philanthropists (e.g., NGOs rather 
than state institutions or public infrastructure projects).  
Russia’s NGOs and the New NGO Law 
Russia currently has approximately 600,000 NGOs (defined as not-for-profit 
groups), although not all of them are active. Russian law recognizes some thirty NGO 
forms. In practice, Russian NGOs tend to fall into one of three categories. “Elite” NGOs 
are relatively wealthy organizations with million-dollar budgets. They are often asso-
ciated with big Russian businesses or serve as “VIP landing grounds” where former gov-
ernment officials can use a “golden parachute” to occupy an influential and prominent 
position after leaving office. Some influential Russians create organizations to occupy 
family members—especially wives and children, in this still highly patriarchal country. 
Second, “intermediary institutions” such as museums and social welfare organizations 
have characteristics of both government and non-government bodies. Wealthy donors 
sometimes purchase works of art, advanced medical equipment, or other expensive items 
for their favorite organizations. For example, Vladimir Potanin’s extensive support for St. 
Petersburg’s Hermitage Museum, a quasi-public institution, resulted in his being elected 
as chairman of its board of trustees. Finally, “grass-roots organizations” are the most 
numerous and varied. These NGOs have pursued a variety of causes, both at the national 
and local levels. Many of them can be considered political, if the definition encompasses 
non-partisan social advocacy. 
Whither Russian Philanthropy? 
The new NGO law may not greatly affect Russian philanthropy. The current 
political system is already highly centralized and paternalistic. Recent government efforts 
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to exert greater control over Russia’s voluntary nonprofit sector have not reversed the 
long-run growth of indigenous philanthropy or its contribution to developing Russian 
civil society. The new law could substantially influence constrain and deter foreign 
donors, but they constitute a minor share of philanthropic activity in Russia. In addition, 
the legislation could have the consequence of allowing the bureaucracy to decide arbi-
trarily whether a group constitutes an unlawful NGO, impeding its rights to collect and 
spend donations. Meeting its regulations also will increase the operating expenses of 
small foundations, potentially driving some of them out of business. In the end, however, 
no one knows precisely what the law will do, because so much depends on how it is 
implemented.11
According to a study by Hudson Institute’s Bradley Center for Philanthropy and 
Civic Renewal, the increasing resources and independence enjoyed by American founda-
tions have enabled them “to attempt projects that government and business have been 
unwilling or unable to carry out for political or financial reasons.”12 Russian philanthropy 
likewise could fill in substantial gaps. The continued growth of indigenous philanthropy 
is thus important for improving socioeconomic conditions and strengthening civil society 
in Russia. 
Russian philanthropy has already helped to alleviate major social problems. In 
today’s Russia, the voluntary nonprofit sector collaborates with government and business 
(including large corporations) on a wide variety of endeavors, including creating an 
effective social welfare infrastructure and supporting research, education, and the arts. In 
this third sector, foundations serve as primary channels through which profits earned by 
individuals and businesses are distributed to address important social issues. In some 
Russian regions, such as the city of Togliatti, “community foundations” have become 
effective mechanisms for delivering resources to those organizations and individuals 
most in need of support.13 Donors can address urgent social needs through the proliferat-
ing number of private and family foundations, which often have the flexibility to respond 
much more rapidly than public institutions, with their extensive legal requirements and 
cumbersome bureaucratic processes. 
In Russia, the influence of foundations within the third sector results less from the 
monetary values of their grants—which is relatively small compared with government 
spending and corporation investments—than from their flexibility in responding to needs, 
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at http://www.icnl.org/journal/vol6iss1/rel_thomasprint.htm.  
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their willingness to innovate and take risks, and the pluralistic and transparent nature of 
their decision-making processes. With time, many Russian foundations may go on to 
develop unique expertise in their special areas of interest and become clearinghouses of 
information about new approaches to problems and other funding sources, like many 
American foundations.14
As Russian philanthropy grows, it will provide additional funding for activities 
that have previously been supported primarily by Western donors. With both Russian 
authorities and Western foundations becoming increasingly uneasy about continuing 
American and European philanthropic activities in Russia, indigenous donations may 
need to account for a growing percentage of the costs of these activities. These contribu-
tions could help sustain essential social work and strengthen Russia’s third sector in gen-
eral. 
Creating a more robust independent civil society in Russia requires making phi-
lanthropy more independent of the state and less dependent on corporate generosity. Yet, 
increasing the involvement of individuals and the middle class will take some time. It 
will require not just new legislation, but a great deal of socio-cultural change as well, 
particularly the development of a new culture of individual philanthropic behavior. In a 
recent opinion poll, over half of Russian respondents lacked awareness of the existence of 
philanthropic organizations in Russia.15 Additional educational efforts are clearly neces-
sary to persuade Russians of the importance of philanthropy for creating a healthy and 
dynamic society.
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